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BIG BROTHER GETS A MAKEOVER: BEHAVIORAL 
TARGETING AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
ABSTRACT 
A staggering 239 million Americans have access to the Internet and spend, 
on average, sixty hours each month online, visiting some 2646 websites. What 
few Internet users realize is that, during the time they surf the Web, they are 
subjected to constant surveillance by potentially hundreds of different private 
companies. These companies, called advertising networks, track Internet users 
across the Web, collecting all sorts of personal information about them—their 
gender, age, income, location, medical concerns, sexual orientation, political 
affiliations, and music preferences, among many other things. Advertising 
networks then use this information to deliver highly personalized online 
advertisements to Internet users, a process known as behavioral targeting. 
But advertising networks can use the information they collect for purposes 
beyond behavioral targeting. In addition to exploiting Internet users’ 
information to deliver targeted advertisements, ad networks sell the 
information to third parties, which could include, perhaps surprisingly, the 
government. Armed with detailed records about Internet users and their online 
activities, the government has unprecedented access to the most intimate 
details of peoples’ lives. What seems such a gross invasion of privacy can 
occur despite the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government. The Fourth Amendment likely does 
not apply to information gathered for behavioral targeting because of what is 
known as the “third-party doctrine.” Under the third-party doctrine, the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect any information a person volunteers to a 
third party, because that person presumptively has assumed the risk that the 
third party will reveal the information to the government. 
This Comment explores why the third-party doctrine would apply in the 
context of behavioral targeting, resulting in an unprecedented threat to 
Americans’ privacy. Arguing that the Supreme Court’s justification for the 
doctrine is inherently flawed, this Comment sets forth a new way of 
conceptualizing the third-party doctrine and a corresponding analytical 
framework called the “competing-interests test.” The competing-interests test 
ultimately seeks to reconcile the conceptual difficulties that arise when 
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applying the doctrine not only within the context of behavioral targeting but in 
all situations in which a third party holds information about another person. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Brandeis once predicted that, in the future, “[w]ays may . . . be 
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret 
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose . . . the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances 
in . . . sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts 
and emotions.”1 Justice Brandeis’s warning, from his famous dissenting 
opinion in Olmstead v. United States,2 perhaps seemed far-fetched in 1928 
when it was published. Eighty-four years later, however, the Justice’s 
prediction has proven startlingly insightful, if not frighteningly accurate. 
Indeed, true to Justice Brandeis’s vision, in the last decade the government has 
developed a powerful tool for not only exploring but also exploiting peoples’ 
“unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.” That tool is the Internet—or, 
 
 1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 2 277 U.S. 438. 
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more precisely, the capacity to indirectly track individuals on the Internet 
through private companies that conduct “behavioral targeting.” 
Behavioral targeting is an online advertising technique designed to deliver 
specific, targeted advertisements to Internet users based on their perceived 
interests. Companies that conduct behavioral targeting, known as advertising 
networks, are able to predict Internet users’ interests by using sophisticated 
technology that tracks and gathers information about users’ online activity.3 
The resulting targeted ads are approximately twice as effective as—and, 
therefore, much more valuable than—other forms of online advertisements.4 
As a result, online content providers can fund their entire operations with 
revenues from selling online advertising space, making it possible for websites 
to offer online content for an unbeatable price—for free. 
Over the last decade, behavioral targeting has proven increasingly 
important, if not essential, as a means of supporting free content on the 
Internet. According to industry experts, targeted ads “significantly enhanc[e] 
the advertising revenue engine driving the growth of the Internet”5 and are a 
critical component of “the economic model supporting free online content and 
services for consumers.”6 But describing behavioral-targeting-supported online 
content as “free” is somewhat misleading. Online content is “free” only in 
monetary terms; with respect to privacy, however, behavioral targeting exacts 
a hefty price. Behavioral targeting requires that ad networks collect and retain 
immense amounts of data about Internet users. Moreover, under current law, 
ad networks essentially enjoy unmitigated leeway to use the information they 
collect for whatever other purposes they wish. In addition to using Internet 
users’ information for targeted ads, ad networks trade and sell information to 
third parties,7 which could include the government. Thus, unbeknownst to the 
millions of people who regularly surf the Internet, their personal information 
 
 3 See TRUEFFECT, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2 
(2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/080411trueffect.pdf (describing 
the Internet as one big “ad delivery mechanism”). 
 4 Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE 3, http:// 
www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 5 Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More than Twice as 
Valuable, Twice as Effective as Non-Targeted Online Ads (Mar. 24, 2010) (quoting Howard Beales, former 
Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_ 
Beales_Release.pdf. 
 6 Id. (quoting Charles Curran, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative). 
 7 See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W1. 
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has been put on sale for the government to buy up and then use to monitor their 
online activity. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Fourth Amendment—the bulwark of 
constitutional privacy—likely offers little to no protection because of what is 
known as the “third-party doctrine.” Under the third-party doctrine, the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect a person’s privacy in information she has 
volunteered to a third party.8 Likely falling within this definition is information 
collected by advertising networks for behavioral targeting. 
This Comment explores the privacy implications of the Fourth Amendment 
third-party doctrine within the context of behavioral targeting. Part I provides a 
brief explanation of how behavioral targeting works and why it plays such an 
important role on the Internet. Part II offers an overview of the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to government searches, 
including the development of the third-party doctrine, and explores the primary 
criticisms of the doctrine. It then goes on to explain how the third-party 
doctrine might apply to ad-network databases, noting that a paradoxical 
problem would arise if ad networks were forced to obtain Internet users’ 
consent to conduct behavioral targeting: while Internet users would gain some 
degree of privacy if they were given notice and an opportunity to opt out of 
tracking, those users who chose to remain opted in to access free online 
content would relinquish their privacy to the government because the third-
party doctrine, at least under its current formulation, would inevitably apply. 
Part III presents a critical analysis of the Court’s third-party doctrine, arguing 
that the problem stems both from a common misconception of Fourth 
Amendment privacy (as strictly “informational”) and from a limited perception 
of the justification for the third-party doctrine. The Comment then offers a new 
analytical framework for the third-party doctrine, called the “competing-
interests test,” that incorporates these two considerations. Under this newly 
conceptualized third-party doctrine, Internet users would retain Fourth 
Amendment protections even if they consented to behavioral targeting. 
 
 8 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). 
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I. BEHAVIORAL TARGETING AND THE INTERNET 
A. How Behavioral Targeting Works 
Online behavioral targeting involves four key players: (1) the Internet user; 
(2) the content provider, the website that provides online content and displays 
an advertisement to the Internet user; (3) the advertiser, the company seeking 
to advertise its product;9 and, finally, (4) the ad network, the company that acts 
as a middleman to the advertisers and content providers. The ad network is 
responsible for tracking and profiling the Internet user, and then placing the 
advertiser’s ad on the content provider’s website when the website is visited by 
an interested user.10 
The ad network gauges an Internet user’s interest in any given product by 
collecting and analyzing data about the user from three different sources. First, 
the ad network collects information from individual content providers about an 
Internet user’s particular activity on any given website.11 Second, the ad 
network gathers information provided by multiple content providers, called 
“clickstream” data, which reflects an Internet user’s activity across the Web.12 
Finally, the ad network supplements the information it gathers with data about 
any given individual it obtains from third-party commercial databases.13 
First, an ad network can gather information from a content provider that 
reveals a user’s specific activity on the content provider’s website.14 
Technically speaking, this occurs in one of two ways. When a website 
connects to a user’s computer, it can attach the user’s information to a 
command.15 The user’s browser then sends the command to an ad network 
requesting an appropriate advertisement based on the attached information.16 
Alternatively, the content provider might simply send the information to the ad 
 
 9 Targeted ads are also used to promote political candidates. See David Herbert, Candidates Walk Thin 
Line with Targeted Web Ads, NAT’L J. (Jan. 10, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/ 
candidates-walk-thin-line-with-targeted-web-ads-20081001?mrefid=site_search (discussing how the Obama 
and McCain 2008 presidential campaigns exploited behavioral targeting). 
 10 See Behavioral Advertising Across Multiple Sites, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.cdt.org/content/behavioral-advertising-across-multiple-sites [hereinafter Behavioral Advertising]. 
 11 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 2–3 (June 18, 2009), 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_felten.pdf. 
 12 See id. at 3–4. 
 13 Id. at 4. 
 14 Id. at 2. 
 15 Id. at 3. 
 16 Id. 
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network directly.17 The information sent to the ad network can represent the 
Internet user’s activity on the website at any given moment or over a period of 
time, and can include any personally identifiable information the user discloses 
to the website when, for instance, she signs up for a service or completes a 
survey.18  
Depending on the user’s activity and the nature of the website, an ad 
network may be able to paint a fairly detailed portrait of a user based on this 
information alone. For example, if an Internet user is browsing through an 
online women’s magazine, the ad network might learn that she is female, 
somewhere between ages twenty and thirty-five, and interested in fashion. But 
the information could be much more specific. For example, if the user accesses 
articles about depression and dieting, the ad network might note that she is 
depressed and wants to lose weight. If the Internet user signs up for the 
magazine’s online sweepstakes, the ad network might then know her real 
name, phone number, and e-mail and home addresses. Thus, if the user is 
reading an article about weight loss on the website, the ad network might 
display any number of targeted ads based on her activity on that website alone: 
an ad for workout clothes based on a page she is currently viewing, an ad for a 
depression medication based on her past activity on the website,19 or an ad for 
a nearby business based on location information she provided.20 
Second, an ad network can gather data about an Internet user by tracking 
her online activity across multiple websites.21 This information is known as 
clickstream data.22 To collect clickstream data, the ad network sends a 
“cookie”23 to the user’s browser when she visits a website, which the user’s 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 See id. at 2–3. 
 19 Or, if the ad network is particularly cruel, it might display an ad for cheesecake, believing that dieters 
are more susceptible to focusing on their cravings. Stephen Henderson is concerned that an evil ad network 
might send depressed users advertisements for books about how to commit suicide. Stephen E. Henderson, 
Response, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 47 
(2011), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Henderson.pdf. Assuming such books exist, 
Henderson’s fear seems questionable at best. 
 20 An ad network could determine the user’s geographic location from her Internet Protocol (IP) address 
as well. 
 21 See Behavioral Advertising, supra note 10; Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 3. 
 22 For an excellent explanation of the evolution of cookie technology in online advertising, see Andrew 
Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the Internet: Notice and Consent in the 
Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529 (2008). 
 23 The Network Advertising Initiative defines cookies as “information (a small text file) that a site saves 
to your computer using your web browser” that “may allow sites to record [a user’s] browsing activities” and 
that “may be placed in [a user’s] browser by a third-party advertising network or company that helps deliver 
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computer then stores on its hard drive.24 The cookie contains a unique number 
that allows the ad network to identify the user when she connects to another 
website within its network.25 Thus, by recognizing the user’s cookie, the ad 
network can track the user across the Internet, gathering information about her 
“web page visits, searches, online purchases, videos watched, [and] posts on 
social network[s],” among other things.26  
An ad network’s cookie categorizes the user’s online activity into distinct 
“segments” that supposedly reflect her interests and that are used to determine 
which ads to display.27 For example, according to an investigation on online 
tracking conducted by the Wall Street Journal, one of the largest ad networks, a 
company called RapLeaf, used segments such as “household income range, 
age range, political leaning, and gender and age of children in the household, 
as well as interests in topics including religion, the Bible, gambling, tobacco, 
adult entertainment and ‘get rich quick’ offers.”28 In total, RapLeaf’s cookies 
segmented Internet users into over four hundred categories.29 Armed with the 
user’s browsing history represented in segments, the ad network can then 
display advertisements that reflect the user’s interests when she is viewing a 
website that is entirely unrelated to that interest. For example, if, after reading 
the article about depression on the online women’s magazine, the Internet user 
then visits another website to check the weather forecast, the ad network might 
at that point display an ad for an antidepressant. 
An ad network can then take the information it gathers through both 
individual content providers and tracking cookies and compile everything it 
knows about a particular user into a personal “profile.”30 These profiles are 
often quite comprehensive—so much so that they can personally identify 
individual Internet users.31 This can occur even if the ad network technically 
 
the ads [a user] sees online.” Managing Your Privacy: FAQs, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www. 
networkadvertising.org/managing/faqs.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 24 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Christopher Calabrese, Written Statement of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 3 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Statement_for_11-19-
09_hearing_before_Subcommittees_on_Commun_Tech_and_the_Internet__Commerce_Trade_Consumer_Pro
tection.pdf. 
 27 See Cracking the Code, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2010), http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_ 
RAPLEAF_20101018.html. 
 28 Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at A1. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4. 
 31 See id. 
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does not collect any “personally identifiable information”—information such 
as a “name, address, telephone number, email address, financial account 
number, [and] government-issued identifier” that can be used “to identify, 
contact or precisely locate a person.”32 Notably, ad networks are not bound 
(legally or otherwise) to refrain from collecting personally identifiable 
information, and as a result, ad networks that do so face few consequences in 
the unlikely event they are detected.33 
Finally, an ad network can supplement its user profiles with information 
purchased from commercial third-party databases.34 For example, 
“supermassive databases”—like those made available by companies such as 
LexisNexis—offer billions of records about individuals aggregated from public 
and private records.35 Thus, a user’s profile could reflect vast quantities of 
highly sensitive personal information, including the user’s “demographics, 
family information, and credit history.”36 
Given the invasiveness of online tracking, wary Internet users may hope to 
avoid behavioral targeting entirely. These users face no easy task. In fact, ad 
networks have developed technological capabilities to actually prevent users 
from effectively removing tracking cookies.37 For example, a mechanism 
called a “Flash cookie” effectively bars a user from deleting tracking cookies 
 
 32 Managing Your Privacy: FAQs, supra note 23. The Wall Street Journal’s investigation of behavioral 
targeting revealed that one ad network used enough specific segments in its cookies that it came “extremely 
close” to “de-anonymizing” the user—at least “[close] enough to narrow him down to one of just 64 or so 
people world-wide.” Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at A1 (emphasis added) (quoting Peter Eckersley, Technology Projects Director, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads 
Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against 
Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8 n.31 (2009) (“[R]esearch has shown that there is really no such 
thing as non-personally identifiable information because nearly all so-called anonymized data can be linked to 
a particular person.”). 
 33 See Hotaling, supra note 22, at 541 (“Amounting to little more than a non-binding policy statement, 
the [self-regulatory] principles have no legal effect on the use of [behavioral targeting] technology by the 
online advertising industry.”). See generally infra Part II.A (discussing the ad-network industry’s self-
regulatory principles and the lack of effective legal regulation regarding the collection of personal 
information). 
 34 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4. 
 35 Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1738 (2006). 
 36 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4. 
 37 And as Edward Felten points out, “There are no technical barriers to the ad [network] selling this 
information to third parties.” Id. 
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by instantly and automatically regenerating deleted cookies.38 Flash cookies 
are often embedded in online videos39 and are configured such that a user’s 
browser saves them in a different location than it does tracking cookies.40 
Thus, when the user deletes her tracking cookies, the Flash cookies remain on 
her computer and can restore whatever tracking cookies she tried to remove.41 
But even if a user successfully deletes all of her cookies—Flash and tracking—
it simply means that the ad network will install a new tracking cookie on her 
browser. 
When deleting cookies proves futile, an Internet user might then turn to 
other security measures, which include opting out of individual ad networks or 
installing privacy “plug-ins.”42 First, a user can opt out of an ad network to 
limit or block targeted advertisements.43 Perhaps ironically, this process 
requires the Internet user to install the ad network’s unique opt-out cookie on 
her browser.44 But opting out of the various ad networks is not necessarily easy 
or effective. For example, while two industry groups offer centralized locations 
where a user can opt out of some ad networks,45 if an ad network does not 
belong to one of those groups, a user must opt out of each individual ad 
network separately. If, after opting out, a user erases the cookies on her 
browser, she then must opt out from each ad network all over again.46 This 
means that the unwary user who purposely erases her cookies as a privacy 
precaution will become vulnerable to tracking cookies, as will the user who 
inadvertently erases her cookies by selecting the “anonymous browsing” 
setting on her Web browser, for example.47 But opting out has a more basic 
flaw, which is that it offers no guarantee that the ad network will stop tracking 
 
 38 Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 3 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(explaining Flash-cookie technology and noting that Flash cookies selectively respawned ad-network tracking 
cookies, but not opt-out cookies), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862; 
see also Tanzina Vega, Code that Tracks Users’ Browsing Prompts Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at 
B3 (reporting at least five class action lawsuits regarding companies’ use of Flash cookies). 
 39 Fifty-four of the top one hundred websites use Flash cookies. Soltani et al., supra note 38, at 3. 
 40 Id. at 4. 
 41 Vega, supra note 38. 
 42 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How to Avoid the Prying Eyes, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W3. 
 43 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Frequently Asked Questions, PRIVACYCHOICE, http://www.privacychoice.org/faq (last visited Mar. 
27, 2012); Opt Out of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www. 
networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 46 Valentino-DeVries, supra note 42. 
 47 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6. 
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the user.48 Instead, opting out of an ad network only has the effect of blocking 
targeted ads,49 thereby imparting only a false—if not misleading—sense of 
privacy. The Internet user who is seriously concerned about her privacy might 
be better off installing privacy plug-ins. These tools can be used to regularly 
delete cookies or to monitor invisible ad networks that track users without 
serving targeted ads.50 But plug-ins are hardly an ideal or complete solution: 
certain plug-ins might only work with certain browsers, and for 
unsophisticated Internet users, these tools may be difficult to set up. 
Ultimately, regardless of whether people realize it—and despite some 
people’s efforts to avoid it—behavioral targeting has become an integral part 
of the Internet, if not of everyday life. While the Internet has made large-scale 
behavioral targeting technologically feasible, behavioral targeting has, in turn, 
made the Internet sustainable as a limitless source of free content. 
B. Behavioral Targeting and Free Public Access to Online Content 
Online content providers depend heavily on selling ad space on their 
websites to provide free online content. This dependence is made possible, in 
part, by behavioral targeting.51 Because targeted ads are so effective compared 
to other forms of online advertisements, content providers take in relatively 
 
 48 JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT 
ENABLE IT 8 (2009), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=asc_ 
papers. 
 49 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6. The user is still subjected to invisible tracking 
through use of a “[W]eb beacon.” Id. at 4. Web beacons are pervasive even when Internet users do not opt out 
of behavioral targeting. For example, one study revealed that Google’s ad services used Web beacons on 
eighty-eight percent of the sampled websites and on ninety-two of the top one hundred most popular sites. 
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ Understanding of 
Behavioral Advertising 2 (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.tprcweb.com/ 
index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=0&view=finish&cid=123&catid=48. 
 50 Valentino-DeVries, supra note 42. 
 51 Content providers’ dependence upon ad revenue stems from a number of factors, including the 
removal of meaningful barriers to making perfect copies of digital content on the Internet, rampant copyright 
infringement, and the resulting inability of content providers to profit from direct sales. See Ben Depoorter et 
al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2011) (“Digital downloading and file sharing present 
unprecedented challenges to the enforcement of copyright law. These new technologies greatly facilitate 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted material.” (footnote omitted)). While the death of 
copyright on the Internet is beyond the scope of this Comment, for an enlightening discussion of recent 
technological advances, including the Web, that have created complications in the application of copyright 
protections, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001). 
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greater profits from selling online ad space.52 With increased profits, websites 
can provide online content without needing to charge the Internet user a fee.53 
As free online content has become the norm, behavioral targeting has become a 
practical necessity for sustaining the Internet. In the words of the Network 
Advertising Initiative, a cooperative of advertising networks, “[T]he increased 
revenues associated with [targeted ads] are vital to supporting the continued 
growth in ad-supported Web content.”54 
When viewed in isolation, behavioral targeting is purely beneficial, 
allowing for the continued growth of the Internet and the increasing 
availability of free online content.55 And consider the alternative: If people 
were required to pay even a small amount of money to access a website, it is 
unlikely that the average Internet user would visit 2646 different websites each 
month as they do currently.56 But the benefits of behavioral targeting are far 
less compelling when viewed from a privacy perspective given the ease with 
which online tracking invokes images of Orwell’s Big Brother57 or Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon.58 The current question, then, is whether the benefits of 
behavioral targeting outweigh the potential privacy harms that result from the 
near-constant tracking of Internet users. 
 
 52 See Beales, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that behavioral targeting is about twice as profitable as standard 
online advertising techniques). One study found that revenue from behavioral targeting could be matched only 
by “highly obtrusive ads.” Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display Advertising: Targeting and 
Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389, 400 (2011). 
 53 Beales, supra note 4, at 1. 
 54 Memorandum from the Network Adver. Initiative to the Internet Policy Task Force 5–6 (June 14, 
2010) (emphasis added), available at http://naiblog.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Commerce-Comments1. 
pdf; accord Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, In Defense of Data: Information and the Costs of Privacy, 2 
POL’Y & INTERNET 149, 157, 160 (2010) (explaining how privacy advocates often ignore the trade-off between 
privacy and free information). 
 55 These benefits may seem even more attractive during difficult economic times, when consumers are 
less likely to pay for online content. Testimony of Anne Toth, Vice President of Policy and Head of Privacy, 
Yahoo! Inc., COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 3 (June 18, 2009), http://democrats. 
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_toth.pdf. 
 56 Catharine Smith, Internet Usage Statistics: How We Spend Our Time Online, HUFFINGTON POST (May 
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/22/internet-usage-statistics_n_620946.html. 
 57 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
 58 Bentham’s Panopticon is a prison in which none of the prisoners can see whether anyone is watching 
them, but each knows that anyone could be watching at any time. Bentham described the Panopticon as a new 
mode of obtaining “power of mind over mind,” “in [a] hitherto unexampled quantity.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201, 202, 206 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1995) (1975) (quoting 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37, 39 (John 
Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) (1787)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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II. PRIVACY 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to 
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, 
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
—Olmstead v. United States59 
A. Introduction: Overview of Current Privacy Protections 
The law offers little meaningful protection for Internet users seeking to 
shield their online activity from the prying eyes of both private third parties 
and the government. As a result, behavioral targeting poses a very real threat to 
Internet users’ privacy.60 
Internet users seeking to protect their information from private third parties 
might turn to a variety of legal remedies: online privacy policies under a 
contract theory, common law privacy torts, federal privacy laws, or the ad-
network industry’s self-imposed standards.61 These protections are fairly 
limited. For example, with only a few exceptions,62 websites are not legally 
required to adopt privacy policies. Privacy policies that websites do adopt are 
often impossibly confusing and unreasonably lengthy for the average Internet 
user, serving little purpose but to shield the website from liability.63 Therefore, 
 
 59 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 60 See Testimony to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection, and the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet, 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 2–5 (June 18, 2009), http://democrats.energycommerce.house. 
gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_chester.pdf. 
 61 See Luke J. Albrecht, Note, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies and Remedies for Internet Users, 
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 424–37 (2003). 
 62 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1303, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (2006) 
(requiring a privacy policy for websites that collect information about children under age thirteen); Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act § 502, id. § 6802(b)(1)(A) (requiring clear and conspicuous statements of information-
gathering practices by an institution that is significantly engaged in financial activity if that institution 
discloses nonpublic personal information to third parties). 
 63 See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOWPRIVACY 11 (2009), available at http://knowprivacy.org/report/ 
KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf (reporting that privacy policies are ineffective because they are difficult and 
time-consuming to read, and lead consumers to believe they are protected); Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. 
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an Internet user seeking to enforce a website’s privacy policy against the 
website under a contract theory is likely doomed from the outset.64 Similarly, 
common law privacy torts—including intrusion into seclusion, 
misappropriation of likeness, and public disclosure of private facts65—offer 
weak remedies in the context of behavioral targeting because they require a 
plaintiff to show some discrete harm committed by a distinct tortfeasor.66 This 
is often a difficult task given the indirect and invisible nature of ad-network 
activity.67 
In addition, federal statutory privacy laws are complex and ill-equipped for 
protecting Internet users from behavioral targeting.68 For example, while the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) offers Internet users 
some protection from private parties intentionally accessing or intercepting 
stored electronic communications,69 courts have held that the ECPA does not 
apply to clickstream data.70 Similarly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
which protects against third parties obtaining unauthorized information by 
accessing a computer,71 fails to provide any meaningful remedy because the 
statute’s minimum-damages requirement is difficult to meet in the case of 
behavioral targeting.72 
 
Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public: Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, 
Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & Technology 4 
(Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf (“In many cases, 
consumers don’t notice, read, or understand . . . privacy policies. They are often posted 
inconspicuously . . . and filled with fine-print legalese and technotalk. A recent study . . . found that they were 
essentially incomprehensible for the majority of Internet users.”). 
 64 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (inferring 
that plaintiffs, a class of Internet users, gave implied consent for content providers to share personally 
identifiable information with their contractual affiliates). But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 
F.3d 9, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to follow DoubleClick, explaining that “consent ‘should not casually 
be inferred’” (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(a)–(c) (1977). 
 66 Hotaling, supra note 22, at 550. 
 67 See id.; see also Albrecht, supra note 61, at 433–36. 
 68 Gindin, supra note 32, at 34. 
 69 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The two 
relevant sections of the ECPA are the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006), and the 
Wiretap Act, id. §§ 2510–2522. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004) (explaining the ECPA). 
 70 See, e.g., In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. C 00-2746 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at 
*4, 14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (noting that cookies placed on a hard drive are not in “electronic storage” for 
the purpose of the Stored Communications Act); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 72 See, e.g., Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1158–60; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519–26. 
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Finally, consumer-protection regulations offer little in the way of protection 
against private third parties. For example, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has taken a hands-off approach to regulating behavioral targeting, only 
periodically pressuring the ad-network industry to self-regulate.73 The ad-
network industry, in an unapologetic attempt to “[f]end off . . . legislation and 
regulation,”74 has developed a set of guiding principles that focuses on 
transparency, consumer control, data security, and accountability, among other 
things.75 Regardless of the industry’s efforts, however, because ad networks 
are not legally bound by their own rules, they are not forced to abide by 
them.76 For example, according to a 2010 Wall Street Journal investigation, 
RapLeaf, a major ad network, was discovered to have been transmitting 
personally identifiable information linked to sensitive data to other companies 
in violation of the industry principles.77 
Recently, the FTC has renewed its efforts to crack down on what many 
perceive to be an out-of-control industry. The FTC’s proposed guidelines 
would allow Internet users to opt out of online tracking once and for all 
through the creation of a national “Do Not Track” list, similar to the National 
Do Not Call Registry for telemarketing.78 Though the proposals are by no 
means perfect, they represent an important improvement. 
Internet users seeking to restrict government access to information gathered 
by private third parties face similarly steep legal obstacles. For example, one of 
 
 73 The FTC first expressed concern about targeted ads in 1999 and, in 2007, issued guidelines containing 
general principles for behavioral targeting, see FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE 
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf, which it revised in 2009, see FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 74 About the IAB, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2012). 
 75 AM. ASS’N OF ADVER. AGENCIES ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING 2–4 (2009), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf. These 
principles are based more or less on the FTC’s suggestions and include education, transparency, consumer 
control, data security, material changes to existing online, behavioral-advertising policies and practices, 
sensitive data, and accountability. Id. at 1. 
 76 See Gindin, supra note 32, at 34 (“A potential problem with self regulation is that unless there are 
formal sanctions available for violations of established guidelines, some companies may be inclined to ignore 
industry guidelines or to minimize their significance.”). 
 77 See Steel, supra note 28. 
 78 See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 63–69 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/ 
101201privacyreport.pdf; Testimony of Daniel J. Weitzner, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 10 
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20101202/Weitzner.Testimony.12.02. 
2010.pdf. 
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the most sweeping federal privacy laws regulating the government’s collection 
and use of personal information, the Privacy Act of 1974, does not prevent the 
government from accessing information gathered for behavioral targeting.79 
This is because the Act likely does not apply when the government accesses 
information from third-party databases without actually establishing its own 
database or without “retriev[ing]” the information through use of a “name or 
other personal identifier.”80 As a result, the Act would not apply in the case of 
behavioral targeting where the government accesses information collected in 
databases created and controlled by advertising networks. This conclusion is 
particularly troubling because federal statutory laws are likely the only tools 
for providing uniform privacy protection in the context of behavioral 
targeting.81 Indeed, information gathered for behavioral targeting does not 
seem to fall within the protective scope of the Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment is implicated when the government violates “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”82 There is a clear case that the 
Fourth Amendment would protect people from direct online tracking 
performed by the government, as opposed to an ad network.83 On the other 
hand, because ad networks are not state actors, ad networks cannot violate 
users’ Fourth Amendment rights by collecting information about them through 
online tracking. 
 
 79 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 80 See Privacy: The Use of Commercial Information Resellers by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census & Nat’l Archives of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th 
Cong. 97 (2008) (testimony of Paula J. Bruening, Deputy Executive Director, Center for Information Policy 
Leadership, Hunton & Williams LLP) [hereinafter Bruening Testimony] (quoting Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 
1403, 1408 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552a (stating that the Privacy Act only applies to 
information maintained in a “system of records,” meaning a “group of any records under the control of any 
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”). Further, under the ECPA, the government 
can access or intercept routing information (e.g., websites visited by an Internet user) from an Internet Service 
Provider as long as the government certifies to a court that the information it seeks is “relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation” and is “likely to be obtained.” 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1). 
 81 Though this Comment focuses on more broadly applicable privacy laws, it should be noted that some 
states offer protection in this area. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11015.5(a) (West 2012) (requiring that 
government agencies provide certain notices to individuals when collecting personal information 
electronically). 
 82 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 83 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1005, 1018 (2010) (proposing a framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet and 
arguing that the approach should apply to “content surveillance,” or surveillance of “private thoughts and 
speech”). 
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The relevant question, then, is whether the Fourth Amendment applies if 
the government, though not doing the tracking itself, accesses information 
gathered by ad networks. The answer to that question is probably in the 
negative. Under the Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine, the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information a person “volunteers” to a third 
party.84 The third-party doctrine would apply in the case of behavioral 
targeting if, when a person goes online, she “volunteers” information about her 
online activity to an ad network. This means that the government could obtain 
all of the information compiled in an ad network’s profile database and use it 
for whatever purpose it likes—for example, in a criminal investigation—even 
though the database is comprised of information that the government could not 
lawfully collect itself.85 In other words, the government could circumvent the 
Fourth Amendment with the cooperation of an ad network and legally conduct 
searches of every Internet user’s online activity, amounting to millions of 
general fishing expeditions. 
In fact, the government has been accessing and mining databases—its own 
and those offered up by third parties—for years.86 In the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the government began accumulating and analyzing “vast 
amounts of data about the everyday transactions of American citizens” through 
its Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.87 In 2002 Congress passed the 
Homeland Security Act, which authorized the Department of Homeland 
Security to use data mining in its investigations.88 A related government 
 
 84 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). 
 85 Bruening Testimony, supra note 80, at 97. 
 86 See Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-Parties to Launder Data 
About ‘The People,’ 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950. 
 87 Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 
317 (2008). Although Congress defunded TIA in 2003 in response to increasing privacy concerns, see 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 111(a), 117 Stat. 11, 534–36, many of 
TIA’s programs have continued in other forms, see Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly 
Dead?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2012). 
 88 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(14), 115 Stat. 2135, 2147 (codified at 
6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(14) (2006)). Congress later passed the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. VIII, § 804, 121 Stat. 362 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3 (Supp. I 2007)), to require 
some transparency in federal data-mining programs. The Act defines data mining as 
a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or more electronic 
databases, where a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a non-Federal entity 
acting on behalf of the Federal Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other analyses 
to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on 
the part of any individual or individuals, 
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program called ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and 
Semantic Enhancement) was created “to troll a vast sea of information . . . and 
extract suspicious people, places and other elements based on their links and 
behavioral patterns.”89 As of 2007, the federal government was operating an 
estimated two hundred data-mining programs.90 And while oversight of 
government data-mining programs is fairly limited,91 a 2008 Government 
Accountability Office report revealed that, in 2005, federal government 
agencies—including the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security—reported plans “to spend a combined total of 
approximately $30 million to purchase personal information from resellers.”92 
According to the report, “The vast majority—approximately 91 percent—of 
the planned spending was for purposes of law enforcement (69 percent) or 
counterterrorism (22 percent).”93 Thus, it seems that commercial-database 
companies and the government are already allies in the pursuit of personal 
information.94 
The remainder of this section offers an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine and important criticisms surrounding 
it. It then discusses in greater detail why the doctrine likely would apply in the 
case of behavioral targeting under the current legal landscape, as well as in the 
event that the FTC’s proposed privacy protections succeed. 
 
id. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(A), where the search is not done by name or with another personal identifier, id. 
§ 2000ee-3(b)(1)(B), and if the purpose of the search “is not solely the detection of fraud, waste, or 
abuse . . . or the security of a Government computer system,” id. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(C). 
 89 Slobogin, supra note 87, at 318 (quoting Ellen Nakashima & Alec Klein, Profiling Program Raises 
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 192 (2007). 
 91 For example, the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b)(1)(B), 116 Stat. 2899, 
2922, which requires that federal agencies publish Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) on data collected 
through information technology, does not apply to searches of data collected by third parties. THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNMENT DATA MINING: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 17 (2010). Further, though the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 
requires federal agencies to compile annual reports on all data-mining activities, it allows agencies to keep 
confidential material private and adopts a very narrow definition of what constitutes “data mining.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000ee-3(c). 
 92 LINDA D. KOONTZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-543T, PRIVACY: GOVERNMENT 
USE OF DATA FROM INFORMATION RESELLERS COULD INCLUDE BETTER PROTECTIONS 3 (2008) (footnote 
omitted). 
 93 Id. at 3–4. 
 94 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1083, 1101 (2002). 
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B. The Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine 
You have no privacy. Get over it. 
—Scott McNealy 
CEO, Sun Microsystems, Inc.95 
The Supreme Court’s modern formulation for determining when a search is 
“unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment comes from its 
landmark decision, Katz v. United States.96 In Katz, the Court held that law 
enforcement had conducted an unreasonable search when it eavesdropped on 
the defendant’s telephone-booth conversation using an electronic surveillance 
device.97 According to Justice Stewart, “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places,”98 and a search is unreasonable if it “violate[s] the privacy 
upon which [a person] justifiably relie[s].”99 The Court noted, however, that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”100 
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, formulated his famous 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test,101 which has come to control when 
determining whether a government search violates the Fourth Amendment. A 
search is unreasonable when it violates a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable only if (1) that 
person herself “exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and 
(2) “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”102 
One might expect that, given Justice Harlan’s test, the Fourth Amendment 
would preclude the government from accessing and analyzing information 
gathered by ad networks for behavioral targeting. After all, many people 
subjectively expect privacy from the government when they use the Internet, 
and their expectation would seem to be one that society would accept as 
 
 95 On the Record: Scott McNealy, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2003, at I1. 
 96 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 97 Id. at 349–50, 359. 
 98 Id. at 351. 
 99 Id. at 353. The defendant in Katz “justifiably relied” on his conversation remaining private because 
“[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place 
a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world.” Id. at 352. 
 100 Id. at 351. 
 101 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. 
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reasonable. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment likely does not protect 
information about Internet users’ online activities because of the so-called 
third-party doctrine. 
The third-party doctrine holds that, under the Fourth Amendment, an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that she 
volunteers to a third party. The Court’s classic statement of the doctrine comes 
from United States v. Miller, a case in which law enforcement officials 
obtained the defendant’s financial records from his bank without a warrant.103 
The Supreme Court held that the government’s activity did not amount to an 
unreasonable search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in records kept by a third party, his bank.104 According to the Court: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.105 
The Court justified its holding on the basis that the defendant had assumed the 
risk that the bank would share his information with the government, regardless 
of the defendant’s actual expectations of confidentiality. According to the 
Court, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”106 
The Court’s assumption-of-risk rationale was actually drawn from another 
line of cases involving undercover agents and confidential informants.107 
Beginning in the 1952 case of On Lee v. United States, the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed by one party to 
another in the course of a conversation.108 The Court subsequently offered 
some justification for its position in Hoffa v. United States, explaining that the 
 
 103 425 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1976). 
 104 Id. at 442. The Court further explained that it made no difference, for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, that the banks were required to maintain the defendant’s financial records pursuant to the Bank 
Secrecy Act. Id. at 443. In addition, the Court rejected any Fourth Amendment challenges based on arguments 
that the banks were acting as agents of the government or that the defendant received no notice of the 
subpoenas. Id. at 443 & n.5. 
 105 Id. at 443. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
 108 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952). A decade later, but still pre-Katz, the Court reaffirmed On Lee in Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427. 
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Fourth Amendment does not protect “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a 
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”109 
Post-Katz, the Court approved the line of cases in United States v. White, 
reframing its reasoning to comport with the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test: a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information she has 
shared with another person because she has assumed the risk that her confidant 
might share that information with the government.110 In essence, the Court 
extracted the assumption-of-risk justification from White and applied it in 
Miller, which differed to the extent that the third party was an entity, instead of 
another person. 
After Miller, the Court developed its third-party doctrine in two more key 
cases. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers he dialed from his home 
telephone.111 The case involved a phone company, which, per the 
government’s request, had installed a pen register112 on the defendant’s home 
telephone to track his outgoing calls.113 The Court applied the third-party 
doctrine after reasoning that a person “volunteers” information as long as most 
people realize or should be aware of the possibility that third parties are 
capable of collecting that information.114 According to the Court, “All 
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the 
telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed.”115 In other words, as long as most 
people realize a third party is capable of collecting information, then any given 
individual assumes the risk that the third party will not only collect that 
information but also share it with the government. 
Nearly a decade later, the Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Smith in its final 
third-party-doctrine case, California v. Greenwood.116 In Greenwood, the 
Court applied the third-party doctrine when the defendant placed a bag of trash 
on the curb outside his home, finding that the defendant had “volunteered” its 
 
 109 385 U.S. at 302. 
 110 401 U.S. at 752 (“[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may 
be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end 
or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”). 
 111 442 U.S. 735, 745–52 (1979). 
 112 A pen register is a device that tracks the numbers dialed from a phone. Id. at 736 n.1. 
 113 Id. at 737. 
 114 Id. at 743–45. 
 115 Id. at 742. 
 116 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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contents to a third party.117 The Court explained that most people realize that 
almost anyone could access the contents of the trash, despite the low 
probability that anyone besides a trash collector would.118 
C. Responses to the Third-Party Doctrine 
Since its inception, the third-party doctrine has elicited resistance from 
lawmakers.119 For example, in response to Miller, Congress passed the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 to provide protection for financial records,120 
and after Smith, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act to protect telephone 
call records.121 Further, courts at both federal and state levels have been 
reluctant to apply the doctrine. The Third Circuit, for example, declined to 
apply the third-party doctrine in a case involving historical cell-site location 
information, on the basis that a cell phone user “has not ‘voluntarily’ shared 
his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”122 At 
least eleven state supreme courts have refused to use the doctrine to interpret 
their own constitutions, and ten states have shown signs that they might follow 
suit.123 
Legal commentators generally disagree with the soundness of the 
doctrine,124 criticizing the Court’s understanding of what constitutes 
 
 117 Id. at 39–41. 
 118 Id. at 41. 
 119 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7(b)–(c), at 736, 747 (4th ed. 2004) (calling the 
third-party doctrine “dead wrong,” “a crabbed interpretation” that “makes a mockery of the Fourth 
Amendment”). 
 120 Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006)). 
 121 Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1868 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127). 
 122 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010). But see, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (“[C]omputer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their [Internet Service 
Provider] subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person—the system operator.”); 
United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *12 n.4 (per curiam) (4th Cir. Aug. 
3, 2000) (“While the Court is aware of the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the Internet as well as the vast extent of 
communications it has initiated, the [Internet Service Provider subscription] information at issue in this case is 
not distinguishable from the materials in Miller and Smith . . . .”). 
 123 Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its 
State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395 
tbl.1 (2006). 
 124 As Professor Orin Kerr notes, “A list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would 
make [for] the world’s longest law review footnote.” Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5 (2009). 
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“reasonable” expectations of privacy as out of touch with reality.125 Many of 
their arguments trace back to the Court’s assumption-of-risk justification, 
which, upon close scrutiny, seems inherently flawed. Assumption of risk is a 
theory based in contract, in which a person who assumes a risk receives some 
benefit or consideration in return, and in which—but for a particular benefit—
she would not assume the risk.126 But a person can only truly “assume” a risk if 
she is both informed of the risk—meaning she understands and appreciates its 
potential consequences and the possibility that they might occur—and has the 
ability to either accept or reject the risk.127 If these two conditions are satisfied, 
then by assuming a risk, a person effectively consents to bear the risk’s 
consequences should they come to pass. Assumption of risk, then, is 
synonymous with voluntary consent. 
Assumption of risk, however, must be distinguished from the concept of 
“notice.” When a person has notice of a risk, she has satisfied only one of the 
two conditions required for assumption of risk: while she has knowledge of a 
risk, she does not necessarily accept it or consent to it.128 For example, drawing 
from an analogy offered by Professor Epstein, a pedestrian who decides to go 
for a walk knows, at a certain level, that she could be run over by a car, but she 
has not agreed to be run over.129 Under tort law, the pedestrian does not 
assume the risk that she will be run over by simply going for a walk, even 
though the pedestrian has some notice of the risk.130 
The notice principle has no place in the Fourth Amendment and especially 
in the third-party doctrine. As Professor Epstein observes, the Court’s “false 
equation of knowledge of a risk with the assumption of the risk” leads to a 
“potential source of abuse” by the government131: if the government notifies 
everyone that it can search every house, then everyone has “assumed the risk” 
 
 125 See id. at 571 (“Such expectations of privacy are common and reasonable, and Justices who cannot see 
that are simply out of touch with society and are misapplying the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 126 Professor Richard Epstein charts the doctrinal origins of the assumption-of-risk theory under the third-
party doctrine. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of 
Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009). 
 127 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in the 
concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice.”); Epstein, supra note 126, at 1204. 
 128 See Epstein, supra note 126, at 1204. Under common law, this concept is known as sciens non est 
volens (“knowing is not volunteering”). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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that their houses will be searched merely because they know their houses will 
be searched.132 The result is absurd. 
Nevertheless, the notice principle is central to the third-party doctrine. In its 
strictest form, the Court equates notice of risk with assumption of risk in two 
instances. First, under the third-party doctrine, a person is said to have 
“volunteered” information to a third party as long as society in general is aware 
that a third party is capable of collecting information.133 Thus, if the Court 
decides that people in general have notice of a risk, the Court treats any given 
individual as having consented to the risk as though the individual had both 
actual knowledge of the risk and an opportunity to reject it. 
Second, even in situations where a person has truly consented to sharing 
information with a third party, the Court treats this limited consent as consent 
to allow the third party to share that information with the government—or, 
stated another way, as consent to a government search.134 Again, the Court’s 
reasoning depends on equating society’s general awareness of the risk—the 
possibility that a third party might share information with the government—
with an individual’s actual knowledge and acceptance of the risk. And while 
there are circumstances in which a person can simply choose not to share 
information with a third party, in many situations, that option is unrealistic or 
effectively unavailable. Indeed, participating in everyday life more or less 
requires sharing information with many third parties. Thus, the inherent flaw in 
the third-party doctrine is that the assumption-of-risk rationale “leaves nothing 
to the underlying substantive right at all.”135 
D. New Technology and the Hopeful Demise of the Third-Party Doctrine 
Despite the lack of enthusiasm toward the third-party doctrine shared by 
Congress, lower federal courts, state courts, and commentators, the Supreme 
 
 132 See id. at 1205. 
 133 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988). Moreover, as Justice Marshall noted in his 
dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, the Court seems too comfortable imputing to society a general 
awareness of third parties’ capabilities to access information, as, for example, in the situation of the telephone 
company’s use of a pen register to track phone numbers. See 442 U.S. 735, 749 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Lacking the Court’s apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation’s telephone books and the 
reading habits of telephone subscribers, I decline to assume general public awareness of how obscene phone 
calls are traced.” (citation omitted)). 
 134 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and 
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) (noting that the third-party doctrine is flawed in 
that “it treats exposure to a limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure to the whole world”). 
 135 Epstein, supra note 126, at 1205. 
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Court has never seriously questioned the doctrine. But two of the Court’s more 
recent cases offer hope that the third-party doctrine may not survive in its 
harshest form, especially when applied in the context of new technology. 
First, in the 2001 case Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court indicated 
that it might be shifting away from the notice-based meaning of “volunteer” 
under the third-party doctrine.136 Ferguson was a case in which the third-party 
doctrine arguably should have applied but which, curiously, was decided under 
the “special needs doctrine”—an exception to the warrant requirement, 
applicable when the government conducts a suspicionless search that is 
motivated by non-law-enforcement purposes.137 At issue was the validity of a 
policy initiated by a hospital and implemented by local law enforcement, 
requiring pregnant women to submit to drug tests in the course of prenatal 
treatment if they met specified criteria indicating cocaine use.138 If a woman’s 
urine tested positive for cocaine, the results “would be turned over to the police 
and . . . could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions.”139 Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the maternity patient had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that “the results of [her urine] tests [would] 
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”140 
Only Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the case fell squarely within 
the third-party doctrine.141 As he correctly pointed out, the Court had “never 
held—or even suggested—that material which a person voluntarily entrusts to 
someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for 
whatever evidence it may contain.”142 The majority responded to Justice 
Scalia’s argument by stating that, because its decision proceeded on the 
assumption that “the patients [had] not consent[ed] to the searches,” the 
patients had not “voluntarily entrust[ed]” any information to a third party.143 
Thus, Justice Stevens suggested that some form of actual consent, as opposed 
to mere notice, was required to trigger the third-party doctrine. 
 
 136 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 137 Id. at 78–81. Under the special needs doctrine, the Court applies a balancing test to determine whether 
a suspicionless search is nevertheless reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 78. The government’s 
non-law-enforcement interest must outweigh the person’s privacy interest. See id. 
 138 Id. at 70–72. 
 139 Id. at 86. 
 140 Id. at 78. 
 141 See id. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because the defendant had voluntarily provided access to the 
evidence, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy to invade.”). 
 142 Id. at 95. Justice Scalia noted that the Ferguson decision “opens a hole in [the Court’s] Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the size and shape of which is entirely indeterminate.” Id. 
 143 Id. at 85 n.24 (majority opinion). 
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However, Justice Stevens did not clarify the nature of the consent to which 
he was referring: Would he have required the patients’ consent for the purpose 
of a government search or, alternatively, only for the limited purpose of 
medical treatment?144 Adopting the former interpretation would effectively 
overrule Miller. Adopting the latter interpretation would narrow the third-party 
doctrine so that it would only apply to cases in which a person actually 
consents to giving information to a third party. This would mean that the 
doctrine would not apply in cases like Smith, in which the Court held that the 
defendant had “volunteered” information to the phone company simply 
because people in general were on notice of the third party’s capacity to gather 
the information. Whatever meaning Justice Stevens intended, courts apparently 
have not read the dictum as either eliminating or limiting the doctrine. 
Regardless, Ferguson may prove important in redefining, or perhaps reigning 
in, the meaning of the word “volunteer” under the third-party doctrine in the 
future.145 
The Court’s 2010 decision in City of Ontario v. Quon suggests that other 
factors could impose broader limitations on the third-party doctrine.146 In 
Quon, a police officer alleged that the city had violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights when the city obtained from a mobile-service provider a transcript of 
text messages the officer had sent from his city-issued pager.147 The transcript 
revealed that the officer had sent non-work-related text messages in violation 
of the city’s policy.148 Although the Court deferred the question of whether the 
police officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, it 
found for the city, explaining that the search, whatever its nature, was 
reasonable.149 Importantly, the Court stressed the need for lower courts to 
exercise caution when applying the Fourth Amendment within the context of 
new technology: 
 
 144 Id. Professor Thai suggests that, in applying Ferguson in future third-party-doctrine cases, “one might 
ask whether other disclosures to third parties fairly constitute general relinquishments of privacy or serve the 
more limited function of obtaining services that have become essential to life in our society.” Thai, supra note 
35, at 1749. 
 145 See Christopher Slobogin, Transactional Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 190 
(2005); Thai, supra note 35, at 1748–49 (arguing that Ferguson limits the third-party doctrine to situations in 
which “volunteering” information is truly elective). 
 146 See 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 147 Id. at 2624–26. 
 148 Id. at 2626. 
 149 Id. at 2630. To the frustration of lower courts, see, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 845–46 (11th 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011), the Court sidestepped the Fourth Amendment issue almost 
entirely, see Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. 
BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012 7:44 AM 
2012] BIG BROTHER GETS A MAKEOVER 581 
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear. . . . 
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and 
information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself 
but in what society accepts as proper behavior. . . . 
. . . Cell phone and text message communications are so 
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means 
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. 
That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.150 
The excerpt reveals the Court’s sensitivity toward two important factors. First, 
courts should be wary of society’s real expectations of privacy, and judges 
should avoid imposing their own conceptions of when privacy is reasonable. 
Second, courts should be alert for circumstances in which technology might be 
a necessary medium for protected First Amendment activity, suggesting that 
expectations of privacy in “self-expression” and “self-identification” warrant 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. Though the effect of Quon has yet to 
be seen, the case offers some hope that the Court might be willing to limit the 
third-party doctrine in certain situations involving new technology. 
E. Does the Third-Party Doctrine Apply to Behavioral Targeting? 
Many commentators fear that the third-party doctrine applies to personal 
information collected by commercial databases. These commentators, 
including Christopher Slobogin,151 Stephen Henderson,152 and Daniel 
Solove,153 have noted the very real danger the doctrine poses in a world of 
increasing digitization and automation.154 As Daniel Solove puts it, the Court’s 
third-party doctrine is “not responsive” to the fact that most people’s personal 
 
 150 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629–30. 
 151 See Slobogin, supra note 145, at 155–57. 
 152 See Henderson, supra note 123, at 392–93 (arguing that the third-party doctrine “provides no leash at 
all” on government access to third-party databases); Henderson, supra note 19, at 39–40 (explaining that the 
doctrine, as it stands today, would seemingly apply to information in commercial databases but hoping that 
“the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine . . . has at least taken ill, and it can be hoped it is an illness from 
which it will never recover”). 
 153 See Solove, supra note 94, at 1137–38. 
 154 Other scholars have adopted this view. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 621–22 (2004); Thai, supra note 35, at 1745 (“[A]ny expectation of privacy 
that we may have [about third-party databases] would be unreasonable under Miller and Smith’s risk-
assumption rationale.”); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 638 
(2011) (arguing that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information reviewed automatically by 
a computer and, therefore, the government infringes upon that expectation by accessing the information). 
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information is aggregated and stored by hundreds of different entities; as a 
result, Solove warns, the doctrine “poses one of the most significant threats to 
privacy in the twenty-first century.”155 
Assuming that the third-party doctrine applies to behavioral targeting, 
Solove does not overstate its potential danger. There are two arguments worth 
noting, however, that call into question the doctrine’s inevitable application to 
behavioral targeting. First, most Internet users do not meaningfully consent to 
behavioral targeting—especially in its current, deregulated form—and many 
more are not even aware of its existence.156 If most Internet users are not even 
aware of tracking, then an individual might not be said to have “volunteered” 
information to an ad network. In turn, if an individual does not “volunteer” her 
information, she also does not assume the risk that an ad network will share her 
information with the government. Second, if the Court adopts Justice Stevens’s 
dictum in Ferguson—which suggested, at the very least, that a person only 
“volunteers” information to a third party if she affirmatively consents to 
sharing information with the third party157—the doctrine is even less likely to 
apply.158 Even if Internet users are fully aware of online tracking, they are not 
given a chance to meaningfully consent to it, short of having the option to 
forgo use of the Internet entirely. These considerations arguably provide some 
basis for finding that an Internet user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information collected by an ad network. 
The possibility that the third-party doctrine does not apply to behavioral 
targeting because of either of the preceding two arguments creates a 
paradoxical situation with regard to privacy. On the one hand, the fact that 
most people are unaware they are being tracked on the Internet is beneficial to 
the extent that, because of their shared ignorance, their Fourth Amendment 
privacy in the information collected about them would be preserved. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to find comfort in the fact that people are 
 
 155 Solove, supra note 94, at 1087. 
 156 One study concluded that users are only “passingly familiar” with cookies, and their understanding of 
behavioral targeting is fraught with “widespread confusion.” McDonald & Cranor, supra note 49, at 7–8. 
 157 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001) 
 158 Given the current state of online privacy policies, it would be a stretch to say that Internet users 
meaningfully “consent” to their terms. See Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 14–15 (2010) (statement of Hon. Jonathan D. Leibowitz, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission) (“[P]rivacy policies have become complicated legal documents that often seem 
designed to limit companies’ liability, rather than to inform consumers about their information 
practices. . . . [C]onsumers do not understand the extent to which companies are collecting, using, aggregating, 
storing, and sharing their personal information.”); sources cited supra note 63. 
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unknowingly subjected to constant surveillance. To that end, recall the possible 
improvements on the horizon: the FTC’s proposed “Do Not Track” list, which, 
if implemented, would allow consumers to choose to definitively opt out of 
behavioral targeting.159 
But the consequence of adopting the FTC’s proposals (or anything like 
them) is that the application of the third-party doctrine would be seemingly 
unavoidable when Internet users choose to “opt in” to behavioral targeting. 
Granting Internet users the power to opt in or out means that both the 
individual Internet user and people in general will have notice that behavioral 
targeting occurs. As a result, those Internet users who decide to opt in will 
have effectively consented to tracking. But Internet users who decide to opt out 
will face another set of consequences. According to one industry expert, 
“[o]pting out of tracking may actually harm consumers” because “[m]uch of 
the free content online today may be[come] unavailable.”160 Assuming that 
those who opt out would be barred from accessing ad-supported online 
content, the unavoidable conclusion is that, in the very near future, a person 
will only be able to access the Internet to the extent it is available today if she 
agrees to be tracked by a third party—and, by extension, the government.161 In 
light of this conclusion, it would seem that the third-party doctrine cannot, in 
the words of Professor Stephen Henderson, “withstand the pressures which 
technology and social norms are placing upon it.”162 In the event that the 
Supreme Court does revisit the doctrine, the question is how it should go about 
doing so. The following Part offers one possible solution. 
III.  A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files. 
—Whalen v. Roe163 
 
 159 See supra note 78. 
 160 Tanzina Vega & Verne Kopytoff, The Opt-Out Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at B1. 
 161 Chances are Internet users would likely not opt out of online tracking if a more secure Internet 
experience meant a more expensive one. See Alastair R. Beresford et al., Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A 
Field Experiment (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5017, 2010). 
 162 Henderson, supra note 19, at 51. Professor Henderson offers his own solution—a four-factor test—for 
determining reasonable expectations of privacy in information given to a third party. Id. at 50–51. 
 163 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
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Commentators who argue that the third-party doctrine applies to 
commercial databases focus on the government’s invasion of people’s 
“information privacy.”164 Information privacy, as distinct from “autonomy 
privacy,” is best defined as a person’s right to control the gathering, use, and 
dissemination of personal information.165 Autonomy privacy, by contrast, is a 
person’s privacy interest in acting in certain ways and making decisions.166 
Though information privacy and autonomy privacy are often described as 
distinct ideas, the two interests are actually “intimately intertwined.”167 
Information reflects a person’s actions or choices because any action or choice 
will generate some information, by way of inference, about the underlying 
act.168 For example, in the context of behavioral targeting, an Internet user may 
have an information-privacy interest in the information collected about her 
online activity but an autonomy-privacy interest in choosing to access the 
various types of online content reflected in the information. The two interests 
are inseparable because the information an ad network collects about the user 
will necessarily represent what content the user chooses to access. 
Though information and autonomy interests are difficult to sever 
conceptually, the law treats them as separate and discrete.169 As the Supreme 
Court recently explained, privacy is typically characterized in the law as 
“involv[ing] ‘at least two different kinds of interests’: one, an ‘interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters’; the other, an interest in ‘making 
 
 164 See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006) 
(reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
(2004)) (observing the “collective effort by a group of scholars to identify a law of ‘information privacy’ and 
to establish information privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry” (footnote omitted)). 
 165 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2004, at 215, 216–17; Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible 
and Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 357, 361 (2000); Richards, supra note 164. 
 166 See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2011). 
 167 Glancy, supra note 165, at 360. 
 168 See id. at 360–62. 
 169 So do commentators. Professor Richards describes the phenomenon: 
Understandings of the privacy right recognized in [the Court’s autonomy-privacy cases] as being 
related to informational meanings of the word are generally considered by scholars to be beside 
the point. To the extent that they consider informational meanings of the word ‘privacy’ in 
connection with [autonomy-privacy cases], scholars generally either note the ambiguity and 
move on, or expressly reject any reading of it as an information privacy case. 
Richards, supra note 164, at 1107 (footnote omitted). 
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certain kinds of important decisions’ free from government interference.”170 
Or, in the words of Professor Neil Richards, information privacy is “a limit on 
the state’s power to scrutinize” personal information representing autonomous 
acts, whereas autonomy privacy is “the individual right to make certain kinds 
of fundamental decisions without state interference.”171 Professor Richards 
emphasizes the meaninglessness of this distinction, noting that the legal 
difference between the two is a matter of definitional subtlety.172 And indeed, 
this distinction is circular: limiting the state’s power to scrutinize an interest 
necessarily results in less state interference with the interest; in turn, if the state 
cannot interfere with an interest, it also cannot scrutinize the interest. 
Nevertheless, the categorization of privacy as either informational or 
autonomy-based has led to the development of divergent bodies of 
constitutional jurisprudence dealing with each.173 Information privacy tends to 
be the subject of the Fourth Amendment, whereas autonomy privacy is 
associated with substantive due process protections found in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,174 and expressive and associational freedoms 
 
 170 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 755 (footnote omitted) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)). 
In January 2011, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion in which it stated that a person’s “‘interest in 
avoiding disclosure’[ of personal information] . . . may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’” Id. at 
751 (third alteration in original) (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, 605). In NASA v. Nelson, the Court 
assumed for its analysis that the Constitution protects “information privacy”—at least defined as the right to 
control dissemination of personal information—under substantive due process. Id. The case involved NASA 
employees who were challenging the government agency’s intrusive background checks. Id. In an 8–0 opinion, 
the Court held that the government had a rational basis for conducting the background checks, and as a result, 
the employees’ hypothetical information privacy was not violated. Id. at 758–59. Notably, the employees’ 
Fourth Amendment challenge was not at issue on appeal; the Ninth Circuit had discarded it under the third-
party doctrine. Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 876–77 (2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 746. Justice Scalia, in his 
concurring opinion, rejected the notion of a constitutional right to informational privacy and warned, in 
reference to the clear applicability of United States v. Miller, that “[c]ourts should not use the Due Process 
Clause as putty to fill up gaps they deem unsightly in the protections provided by other constitutional 
provisions.” Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Though the implications of 
Nelson are far from clear, the case seems to forecast an increasing segmentation and categorization of 
constitutional privacy. Rather than exploring that forecast in detail, this Comment seeks to resolve the 
problems arising from categorizing privacy that manifest in the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine. As 
such, “information privacy” in this Comment refers to the right to control not only the dissemination but also 
the collection and retention of personal information. 
 171 Richards, supra note 164, at 1112. 
 172 Id. at 1115–16. 
 173 Glancy, supra note 165, at 360. 
 174 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006) (distinguishing between 
“decisional privacy” and “information privacy,” and stating that decisional privacy falls under substantive due 
process); Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (describing the different doctrinal frameworks under which the Fourth Amendment and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect privacy). 
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guaranteed by the First Amendment.175 For the most part, the categorization 
works well enough. In certain cases, however, distinguishing between two 
types of constitutionally protected privacy is problematic.176 The third-party 
doctrine offers a prime example. Under the third-party doctrine, if a person 
“volunteers” information to a third party, she loses all constitutional protection 
for the information, regardless of whether it reflects an underlying autonomy 
interest that is otherwise protected by the Constitution.177 The result is that the 
third-party doctrine permits the government to indirectly interfere with a 
person’s constitutionally protected autonomy privacy under the pretext that the 
person is not entitled to information privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
Stated differently, the third-party doctrine works as a vehicle to circumvent 
constitutional protections beyond the Fourth Amendment. 
The remainder of this Comment will explore the nuances of constitutional 
privacy interests in relation to the third-party doctrine, with the goal of 
reconciling the problems that arise in the context of behavioral targeting. The 
following section discusses two initial premises that are critical to resolving 
problems inherent in the third-party doctrine. First, Fourth Amendment privacy 
consists of both information- and autonomy-privacy interests—what will be 
referred to as “information/autonomy privacy.” Second, the third-party 
doctrine is better justified by a rationale that takes into account the third 
party’s privacy interests—specifically, the third party’s autonomy interest in 
sharing information with the government, referred to in this Comment as the 
“third-party-privacy justification.” With these two concepts in mind, the 
Comment then offers a new analytical framework for the doctrine, called the 
“competing-interests test.” Under the competing-interests test, the result in any 
third-party-doctrine case will depend on a weighing of the individual’s 
information/autonomy interest against the third party’s competing autonomy 
interest. Depending on which party’s interest prevails, the individual’s 
autonomy/privacy interest will either be subject to the third-party doctrine or 
be deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The Comment concludes by 
applying the competing-interests test in the context of behavioral targeting and 
by then addressing possible criticisms of the competing-interests test. 
 
 175 See Crocker, supra note 174, at 12, 20, 22. 
 176 According to Professor Richards, the “informational/decisional binary”—as he calls it—is 
“imperfect—a crude sorting of cases that does not hold up well to careful analysis.” Richards, supra note 164, 
at 1115. Richards concludes that the “ambiguity has persisted [in constitutional privacy] such that 
informational elements can be found even in cases falling undoubtedly on the decisional [or autonomy] side of 
the binary.” Id. at 1114. 
 177 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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A. Reconceptualizing the Third-Party Doctrine: Information/Autonomy 
Privacy and Third-Party Autonomy 
This section explains two concepts that are key to understanding and 
reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine. First, as already described, Fourth 
Amendment protections encompass both information- and autonomy-privacy 
interests—what can be described as a single information/autonomy interest. 
Second, a better justification for the third-party doctrine lies in protecting the 
third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with the government, 
not in an individual’s assumption of the risk that a third party will share 
information with the government. 
First, reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine requires accepting, as an 
initial premise, that privacy cannot be viewed in a vacuum—as relating either 
to personal information or to personal choices—because personal information 
inevitably must reflect personal choices. Denying protection for personal 
information results in a denial of protection for the underlying act. Thus, one of 
the main flaws in the third-party doctrine is that it applies only to information 
volunteered to a third party. In the three main third-party-doctrine cases, for 
example, the Court consistently speaks of “information” volunteered to a third 
party and frames the individual’s expectation of privacy as being in 
information. The Miller case dealt with information from the defendant’s 
financial records,178 Smith with telephone calling records,179 and Greenwood 
with the information gleaned from the content of trash.180 This makes sense: 
What else could a third party ever receive from an individual (short of tangible 
objects) that she could then share with the government? But by rigidly 
categorizing an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy as solely 
informational, the Court overlooks the individual’s underlying autonomy-
privacy interests. For example, in Miller, the Court overlooked the defendant’s 
interest in using a bank account; in Smith, the defendant’s interest in making 
phone calls; and in Greenwood, the defendant’s interest in disposing of trash. 
The case of behavioral targeting is no different: a person has an information-
privacy interest in information collected by an ad network and, necessarily, an 
autonomy-privacy interest in accessing the Internet. 
Recognizing one sweeping Fourth Amendment information/autonomy 
privacy interest is especially important because, in some circumstances, the 
 
 178 Id. at 437–38. 
 179 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979). 
 180 486 U.S. 35, 37–38 (1988). 
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individual’s underlying autonomy interest is otherwise protected by the 
Constitution.181 As already noted, the third-party doctrine has the power to 
eviscerate those protections and could even be used to purposely circumvent 
them. 
For example, the third-party doctrine would seem to apply to information 
even when it reflects an underlying autonomy interest protected by the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. By way of 
background, the Court first recognized a constitutional right to autonomy 
privacy under the Due Process Clause in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which it 
held that people have a right to marital privacy, which includes the right to use 
contraceptives.182 The Court has since expanded autonomy-privacy interests 
emanating from substantive due process to protect decisions and activities 
related to family,183 reproduction,184 sex,185 and medical treatment.186 
Generally speaking, the reasoning behind these cases stems from the notion 
that substantive due process protects the right to make intimate decisions 
without government interference. In other words, as the Court recently 
explained, substantive due process protects what society considers “the most 
private human conduct.”187 
 
 181 For example, in the case of behavioral targeting, an Internet user may have an underlying autonomy 
interest in engaging in protected First Amendment activity. If the information collected about such activity is 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment, then the Internet user’s First Amendment rights are effectively 
curtailed, either because she will be substantially deterred from engaging in protected activity or because the 
information gathering itself constitutes a direct interference with her expressive freedoms. 
 182 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 183 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing that “freedom of personal choice 
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” including 
“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (upholding the right of a 
non-nuclear family to live and stay together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (upholding 
marriage as a “basic civil right[] of man” and rejecting a restriction that prohibited interracial marriages 
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 184 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (finding that the right to 
purchase and use contraceptives is constitutionally protected); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (recognizing 
procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man” and “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race”). 
 185 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (establishing the right to engage in private, sexual 
conduct). 
 186 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment . . . .”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980) (holding that a prison cannot involuntarily subject prisoners to psychiatric treatment 
without additional due process protections). 
 187 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). 
BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012 7:44 AM 
2012] BIG BROTHER GETS A MAKEOVER 589 
Similarly, the third-party doctrine in theory applies to information that 
reflects protected First Amendment activity as well.188 The First Amendment 
protects another type of autonomy-privacy interest, distinct from the autonomy 
interest established in the Griswold line of cases and stemming from 
substantive due process.189 The First Amendment safeguards autonomy in the 
realm of religious practice, democratic participation, and, as Justice Thurgood 
Marshall once noted, “the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”190 Indeed, freedom of speech is perhaps the ultimate autonomy 
interest, providing the key to “individual self-realization”191 and “autonomous 
self-determination.”192 These protections provide not only for individual 
autonomy but also for broader, societal autonomy, because freedom of speech 
furthers society’s ability to seek out knowledge and truth, and to engage in 
collective decision making.193 Society’s autonomy interest is manifest in the 
right to engage in the political process and, ultimately, “the right to participate 
in the building of the whole culture.”194 The First Amendment provides broad 
privacy protections to further these autonomy interests, including the rights to 
explore ideas, to associate freely, and to remain anonymous.195 
 
 188 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Professor Daniel Solove has written about the 
problematic intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments, arguing that the Founders intended the Fourth 
Amendment to act as a first line of defense for First Amendment rights. Daniel J. Solove, The First 
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007). 
According to Solove, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is supposed to protect First 
Amendment activity, such that when First Amendment activity is implicated, the Fourth Amendment should 
always require the government to obtain a warrant. Solove, supra. Solove draws from Supreme Court 
precedent demanding that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement be observed with “scrupulous 
exactitude” when First Amendment interests are implicated. Id. at 128–32; accord Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 
476, 484–85 (1965). Nevertheless, the third-party doctrine creates the possibility that First Amendment 
activity might fall outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment and, as a result, receive no protection at all. 
 189 Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 190 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 191 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 192 David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
 193 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989). 
 194 Id. (quoting THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 195 See Solove, supra note 188, at 121 (arguing that government information gathering can threaten 
privacy protections of the First Amendment); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–67 (2002) (invalidating an ordinance that required a government permit 
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The third-party doctrine is at odds with constitutionally protected autonomy 
interests emanating from substantive due process and the First Amendment, 
placing them in tension with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, one key to 
reconciling conflicting notions of constitutional privacy is to recognize an 
expansive conception of Fourth Amendment privacy that encompasses both 
information and autonomy interests. 
Second, in addition to adopting a broader Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest, the Court must replace its flawed assumption-of-risk rationale for the 
third-party doctrine with an alternative justification—referred to here as the 
third-party-privacy justification. Under the third-party-privacy justification, the 
third-party doctrine is a mechanism for protecting the third party’s autonomy 
interest in sharing information with the government, rather than a limit on an 
individual’s privacy based on assumption of risk.196 Mary Coombs argues in 
favor of such an approach, explaining that “[t]o deny even the possibility of 
such a decision [by the third party] is to turn a freely chosen relationship 
[between the third party and an individual] into a status, denying one person’s 
full personhood to protect another’s interests.”197 In other words, the third-
party doctrine is necessary for protecting the third party’s “full personhood,” 
even at the expense of the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy. 
When viewed through the lens of the third-party-privacy justification, the 
third-party doctrine, as it exists now, represents a compromise between two 
competing interests: the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest—
what the Court perceives as a limited information-privacy interest—weighed 
against a third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with the 
government. If viewed from this perspective, one of the inherent problems with 
 
before the distribution of religious pamphlets as a violation of the First Amendment right to anonymous 
political speech); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–23, 527 (1960) (holding that municipalities 
could not require the disclosure of NAACP membership lists and that such a requirement significantly 
interfered with members’ freedom-of-association rights); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63, 466 
(1958) (holding that state scrutiny of NAACP membership lists violated members’ rights to associate freely 
and privately). 
 196 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159; Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or 
the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1643–44 (1987); Slobogin, supra note 145, at 185 (“The 
reason we should treat [personal] interviews differently from [impersonal, automated] records requests is not 
because privacy somehow is irrelevant in the former situation, but because the target’s interest in privacy is 
countered by an even stronger interest—the third party’s autonomy.”). 
 197 Coombs, supra note 196, at 1644. On the other hand, Stephen Henderson has described the third 
party’s interest in sharing information with the government as a “good citizen” as irrelevant and insufficient to 
overcome an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth 
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 
1015 (2007). 
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the Court’s third-party doctrine becomes that, as a rule, the result of weighing 
the two competing interests is always the same. Under the Court’s third-party 
doctrine, the third party’s interest always prevails. In essence, the third party’s 
autonomy interest in sharing information with the government is treated as 
absolute. 
In light of the third-party-privacy justification, this result makes the most 
sense when the third party is a person, or people in general (the public), as 
opposed to an entity. As Professor Slobogin observes, the notion that “no 
person should be able to prevent another from providing information to the 
government” is virtually “incontestable.”198 In cases that involve human third 
parties, such as the undercover-agent and confidential-informant cases (which, 
to recall, were precursors to Miller199), placing a high value on the third party’s 
autonomy interest is not particularly troubling.200 
On the other hand, when the third party is not a person, the result of the 
third-party doctrine under the third-party-privacy justification is less 
compelling.201 Why should a person’s privacy be compromised for the sake of 
an entity’s seemingly lesser autonomy interest? While, at times, the Court has 
reserved a lesser privacy interest for “collective” entities—in one instance 
stating that “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the 
enjoyment of a right to privacy”202—the Court has also affirmed the notion that 
corporate entities possess broad autonomy interests under the Constitution, 
including, for example, in the realm of the First Amendment.203 The current 
state of the third-party doctrine reflects the latter sentiment, at least to the 
extent that entities prevailed in all three of the Court’s traditional third-party-
doctrine cases. Recall that, in Miller, the third party was a bank; in Smith, a 
phone company; and, in Greenwood, a refuse collection company. But 
regardless of the Court’s position on entities’ privacy or autonomy interests—
 
 198 SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159. 
 199 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 200 See supra note 196. 
 201 According to Professor Slobogin, “A bank, hospital, or ISP is not denied its ‘personhood’ when its 
ability to turn information over to the government is restricted.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159. Slobogin 
argues that entity third parties by their nature do not have any autonomy privacy. See id. (explaining the 
justification for the low relevancy requirement to support a subpoena duces tecum for corporate records). 
 202 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). Within the context of the Fifth 
Amendment, for example, an organization that has an identity separate from its individual members does not 
have a right to resist a documentary subpoena, because its records lie outside the “zone of privacy.” SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 90, at 187; see also, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73–75 (1906). 
 203 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First 
Amendment interest in political speech). 
BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012 7:44 AM 
592 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:555 
which is far from clear—instinct suggests that a corporation’s autonomy 
interest in sharing information with the government should yield, at times, to 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy. Thus, in adopting the third-party-
privacy justification for the third-party doctrine, it is essential to recognize that 
the third party’s interest should not be treated as absolute. 
To summarize, then, reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine requires that 
the Court recognize the two important points discussed so far. First, Fourth 
Amendment privacy consists of a broad information/autonomy privacy 
interest, which may implicate autonomy interests that are otherwise protected 
by the Constitution. Second, the third-party doctrine is better justified as a 
means of protecting the third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information 
with the government. The third party’s interest, while valuable, is not absolute, 
and perhaps there are circumstances in which the third party’s autonomy 
interest should yield to an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
information/autonomy interest. 
B. The “Competing-Interests Test” 
With these ideas in mind, the Court should adopt a new analytical 
framework for the third-party doctrine—what will be referred to as the 
“competing-interests test” for the purposes of this discussion. The competing-
interests test is comprised of a two-step analysis. First, the Court must assign 
independent values to both the individual’s and the third party’s competing 
interests, which include the individual’s information/autonomy interest on the 
one hand and the third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with 
the government on the other. Second, the Court must weigh the two interests 
against each other as part of the second prong of the Katz test, which will 
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable as to 
information held by a third party. Under this framework, the third-party 
doctrine will apply as usual when the third party’s autonomy interest 
outweighs the individual’s information/autonomy privacy interest. However, 
the third-party doctrine will not apply when an individual’s 
information/autonomy interest outweighs the third party’s autonomy interest in 
sharing information with the government. Thus, when the individual’s interest 
prevails, the individual’s expectation of privacy should be deemed reasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In the first step of the competing-interests test, the Court should assign a 
value to the two competing interests at stake according to three guiding 
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principles. The first guiding principle is that, when the third party is reporting 
information pursuant to government compulsion—for example, in compliance 
with a warrant or subpoena—the third party’s autonomy-privacy interest 
should be given little, if any, weight. Under these circumstances, the third 
party’s autonomy privacy is nonexistent because she is not exercising any 
choice about whether to share information with the government. Instead, the 
third party effectively is acting as the government.204 This conclusion has some 
important consequences depending on the nature of the government 
compulsion. First, if the compulsion is made pursuant to a warrant, then the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied notwithstanding the third-
party doctrine. Second, in all other circumstances, the third-party doctrine 
typically would not apply at all: because the third party’s autonomy interest is 
so diminished, it will almost always be outweighed by the individual’s 
information/autonomy interest. This conclusion does not mean that 
government compulsion short of a warrant is per se unconstitutional, however. 
Rather, it means that the third-party doctrine cannot be the basis for its validity 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
Under the second guiding principle, the third party’s autonomy-privacy 
interest generally should weigh less when the third party is an entity as 
opposed to when the third party is a human. This principle is based on the 
premise that entities need not enjoy constitutional rights to the same extent that 
individuals do when they come at the expense of individuals.205 In the context 
of behavioral targeting, this means that, because an ad network is an entity, its 
autonomy interest carries less weight in the competing-interests calculus than 
if it were a person. Accordingly, whether the ad network’s diminished 
autonomy interest would prevail in any given situation would depend on the 
relative weight given to the individual’s competing information/autonomy 
interest. Admittedly, this principle creates a gray area because the outcome 
depends on how the Court chooses to value the individual’s 
information/autonomy interest. In turn, how the Court chooses to value an 
individual’s interest might also depend on how it defines the nature of the 
individual’s underlying autonomy interest. Happily, the next principle helps 
resolve some of the blurriness in this area. 
 
 204 See Henderson, supra note 197, at 992 (“If the third party obtaining the information is effectively law 
enforcement, or if that party is obtaining or retaining the information for law enforcement, and it is obtained or 
retained solely for a law enforcement purpose, unfettered collection and/or access [should be considered] 
unreasonable.”). 
 205 See discussion supra notes 32–33. 
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Under the third—and final—guiding principle, the individual’s 
information/autonomy interest should carry the most weight when it involves 
an underlying autonomy interest that is otherwise protected by the 
Constitution,206 such that, when the third party is an entity, the individual’s 
interest should always prevail and the third-party doctrine should never apply. 
The same is not true when the third party is a person, however. Even when an 
individual’s underlying autonomy interest is constitutionally protected, the 
third party’s interest nevertheless should prevail. While this outcome places the 
third party’s interest in sharing information with the government above the 
individual’s constitutional autonomy interest, to hold otherwise would result in 
“denying one person’s full personhood to protect another’s interests,” as 
Professor Coombs observes.207 In the case of behavioral targeting, then, 
because the Internet user’s information/autonomy privacy arguably implicates 
substantive due process or First Amendment rights, the Internet user’s 
information/autonomy interest outweighs the autonomy interest of the ad 
network, an entity. As a result, information collected by ad networks would be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and inaccessible to the government absent 
a warrant. Importantly, however, the result would be different if the ad network 
were a person, instead of an entity. Under those circumstances, the ad 
network’s autonomy interest would always outweigh the Internet user’s 
information/autonomy interest. 
The three guiding principles leave one circumstance unaccounted for—the 
circumstance in which the third party is an entity, but the individual’s 
underlying autonomy interest is not otherwise constitutionally protected. In 
this scenario, the Court would still need to assign values to each party’s 
interest and weigh them against each other accordingly. How the Court would 
value each interest might depend on a variety of other factors, however. As for 
a third-party entity, perhaps a partnership might have a stronger autonomy 
interest than a publicly traded corporation. As for an individual, perhaps her 
autonomy interest should be given greater weight when it reflects an activity 
that is essential to everyday life or which is more or less involuntary. As a 
general rule, an entity’s autonomy interest should prevail against an 
 
 206 Professor Crocker makes a similar, but narrower, argument: “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects not 
only privacy, but also liberty. . . . If the [government] intrusion implicates a protected interpersonal 
relationship, then the State must follow default Fourth Amendment procedures in order to conduct a valid 
search.” Crocker, supra note 175, at 9. 
 207 Coombs, supra note 196, at 1644. 
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individual’s only if it is extremely compelling.208 Concededly, the competing-
interests test threatens to become quite complicated and nuanced under this 
category. The possibility of complication alone should not defeat the test, 
however. While it is possible to imagine any number of factors that would help 
courts navigate the nuances of this category, such an exercise exceeds the 
scope of this Comment. 
Thus, the possible results of applying the guiding principles to the 
competing-interests test is illustrated below: 
  
 
 208 Perhaps, for example, an entity’s autonomy interest might prevail when it seeks to share information 
about an individual to prevent an imminent national emergency. 
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C. Applying the New Third-Party Doctrine to Behavioral Targeting 
The competing-interests test would resolve the fears surrounding a strict 
application of the third-party doctrine to personal information gathered by ad 
networks for behavioral targeting. In particular, the test would permit Internet 
users to consent to behavioral targeting to access online content for free 
without simultaneously relinquishing all Fourth Amendment protections. As a 
result, Internet users could enjoy increased online privacy as to both ad 
networks and the government. The competing-interests test also takes into 
account the reality of today’s increasingly digitized world in which 
participation in everyday life requires sharing information. If, in some not-too-
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distant future, every facet of life is recorded by third parties and kept in a 
database accessible by the government, the third-party doctrine will allow 
modern technology to swallow the Fourth Amendment.209 Behavioral targeting 
offers proof that comprehensive, real-time recordation of people’s personal 
lives is not only possible but already happening. 
Applying the competing-interests test to the case of behavioral targeting is 
fairly straightforward. The first step requires the Court to assign a value to 
each party’s interest—the individual’s information/autonomy interest, on the 
one hand, and the third party’s interest in sharing information with the 
government, on the other—taking into account the three guiding principles. 
The first principle would not apply to behavioral targeting unless the 
government compelled the third party, the ad network, to provide information 
pursuant to a law. Assuming no such compulsion exists, the case does not fall 
under situation V in the table above. Under the second principle, because the 
ad network is an entity, rather than a person, the Court would assign a 
diminished value to the ad network’s interest in sharing information with the 
government. Therefore, depending on how the Court valued the Internet user’s 
information/autonomy interest, the case would fall under situation III or IV. 
How the Court would value the Internet user’s information/autonomy 
interest would depend on how it defined the user’s underlying autonomy 
interest. According to the third principle, if the Court defined the interest as 
one protected under substantive due process or the First Amendment, then the 
Internet user’s interest would prevail. For example, an Internet user arguably 
has a substantive due process right in gathering information about medical 
treatment, or perhaps about issues relating to sexuality on the Internet, because 
exploring information is critical to, or perhaps represents in itself, an intimate 
choice regarding those protected areas.210 The user’s underlying autonomy 
interest might also be defined as a broad First Amendment freedom.211 When a 
person browses the Internet, she engages in protected First Amendment 
activity—she explores and receives ideas, she associates freely, and she may 
have a right to anonymity. 
If the Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest were found to implicate 
either substantive due process or First Amendment autonomy interests, then 
 
 209 According to estimates, the volume of the world’s collected data doubles every year. THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 91, at 8. 
 210 See Solove, supra note 188, at 122. 
 211 See id. at 121–23. 
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under the second prong of the competing-interests test, the Internet user’s 
information/autonomy interest would prevail over the ad network’s interest in 
sharing information with the government and, therefore, would be subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection.212 The result would be the same even if the 
Internet user consented to being tracked when, if given the option to join a “Do 
Not Track” list, she declined in order to access ad-supported online content. In 
other words, the fact that an Internet user consents to being tracked by a third 
party does not mean she enjoys a lesser Fourth Amendment privacy interest as 
to the government. 
On the other hand, the Court might define the Internet user’s underlying 
autonomy interest as one that does not implicate some constitutional right. For 
example, the Court could view the Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest 
as the right to be able to access online content for free. This interest—access to 
free online content—likely garners no support from the Court’s substantive 
due process or First Amendment jurisprudence. As another example, the Court 
could define the autonomy interest as the right to access any given single 
webpage (rather than the Internet in its entirety) without government 
interference. Similarly, this interest may not trigger constitutional protection 
because the amount of interference would be de minimis. Under these narrow 
definitions, the case would fall under the gray area of situation IV, and the 
individual’s information/autonomy interest would only prevail if the Court 
assigned her underlying autonomy interest a higher value (based on 
nonconstitutional considerations) than the ad network’s interest in sharing 
information with the government. 
Though there is no way of knowing how the Court would define the 
Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest, the Court’s recent direction in 
City of Ontario v. Quon suggests that it would be willing to view the interest as 
one that is constitutionally protected.213 To recall, the Court expressed 
sensitivity toward the potential privacy implications of new technology that is 
“so pervasive” that it is an “essential means or necessary instrument[] for self-
expression, even self-identification.”214 The Internet is not only a pervasive 
fixture in everyday life; it is also a permanent and essential one. Tied up in the 
Internet’s role is behavioral targeting, and tied up in behavioral targeting is, 
quite literally, information reflecting self-expression and self-identification. 
 
 212 The case would fall under situation III in the table. 
 213 See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 214 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). 
BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012 7:44 AM 
2012] BIG BROTHER GETS A MAKEOVER 599 
Ultimately, if the government’s unfettered access to this information were 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, then the Court’s language in Quon 
would be stripped of its meaning. At least in light of Quon, it seems that the 
Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest would be constitutionally 
protected, thus triggering Fourth Amendment protection under the competing-
interests test. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Brandeis once described the right to privacy—what he termed “the 
right to be let alone”—as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.”215 Fearing that “[w]ays may some day be developed 
by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, 
[could] reproduce them in court . . . to expose . . . the most intimate 
occurrences of the home,”216 the Justice urged a reading of the Fourth 
Amendment that would allow for adaptation in a world of technological 
change: “Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific 
abuses of power, must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing 
world. . . . ‘[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been but of what may be.’”217 Justice Brandeis’s words 
resonate even more ominously with the advance of behavioral targeting. Never 
before have third parties held so much personal information about so many 
people—a reality likely irreversible given the central and permanent role the 
Internet plays in everyday life. Indeed, “[a]s a means of espionage, writs of 
assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and 
oppression” by comparison.218 In light of these technological developments, it 
is imperative that the Supreme Court reevaluate its third-party doctrine. 
This Comment has argued that the Court could limit the third-party 
doctrine by adopting a new analytical framework called the competing-
interests test. The competing-interests test would require the Court to broaden 
its conception of Fourth Amendment privacy while acknowledging that the 
third-party doctrine is justified as a safeguard of third-party autonomy interests 
in sharing information with the government. Importantly, instead of 
categorically barring Fourth Amendment protection for any information an 
 
 215 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 216 Id. at 474. 
 217 Id. at 472, 474 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
 218 Id. at 476. 
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individual volunteers to a third party, the competing-interests test would 
safeguard an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy when that interest is 
most compelling. Accordingly, the competing-interests test contemplates not 
only what has been but also what may be, so to better secure “the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”—the right 
to privacy. 
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